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Real estate is a major source of value in both developed and developing countries. 
In the United States households have $9.6 trillion or 16 percent of their wealth in real 
estate.1 Farmers have another $1.3 trillion of equity in their farms, bringing total 
household wealth in real estate to nearly 20 percent of household assets.2 Hernando De 
Soto, writing in 1993, said that some 70 percent of Peruvian wealth was in real estate. 3 
One study found that in Uganda “between 50 and 60 percent of the asset endowment of 
the poorest households” was land.4 The World Bank confirms that the proportion of real 
property is between one-half and three-quarters of wealth in most economies.5 
In some countries, of course, agricultural production may be less important 
because mining or fishing or village enterprise take precedence over agriculture, but 
urban living is still the exception in most of the developing world. In the United States, in 
contrast, despite its vast expanse, 79.0 percent of residents live in urban areas.6 But in 
                                                 
α The author would like to thank for their assistance and insight Richard Helmholz of the University of 
Chicago Law School and Maria Dakolias of the United Kingdom Department of Constitutional Affairs as 
well as his research assistant at the Law School, Wonbin Kang. This working paper was written in 
preparation for a forthcoming book length study of the rule of law in economic development. 
1 This is a net figure after deducting mortgages on property. See Federal Reserve. Flow of Funds 
Accounts of the United States: Flows and Outstandings Fourth Quarter 2004. Release Z.1. p. 102, Table 
B.100 (March 10, 2005).  
2 Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. Balance Sheet of  the U.S. Farming 
Sector, 2001-2005F (February 11, 2005) (estimate for 2005). 
3 De Soto (1993, p. 8).  
4 Deininger (2003, p. xx). This reference is a book-length review of research on land ownership and 
transactions in developing countries and incorporates results of prior World Bank and academic research. 
5 World Bank (2006, p. 32). These results appear to be based on 1985 data. See id. at 32 n. 10. 
6 Britannica Almanac 2003, p. 602. 
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highly populated India, only 27.8 percent of people lived in urban areas in 2000.7 And in 
some African countries the urban population is an even smaller proportion; for Ethiopia 




To simplify, it is useful to think of agricultural land as the most important 
development topic so far as real estate is concerned. Yet, in the developing world, 
agricultural land ownership is often shrouded in legal uncertainty: “In many countries, 
especially in Africa, … often more than 90 percent of land remains outside the existing 
legal system.”9 Moreover, in cities the legal situation is often even more uncertain and 
problematic because social norms and bonds of tradition are much looser than in the less 
rapidly changing countryside. De Soto’s study of Peru led him to the conclusion that 
“more than 90 percent of rural and half of urban property rights in Peru are not protected 
by formalized titles—that is, they are ‘informal.’”10 African and Asian developing 
countries present a similar problem: “More than 50 percent of the peri-urban population 
in Africa and more than 40 percent in Asia live under informal tenure and therefore have 
highly insecure land rights.”11  
In rural areas, it is not just the livelihood of those who work the land that is at 
risk. Legal insecurity has broader costs to the economy. For example, where land 
ownership is not recorded in a land registry, farmers often have to pay for fences, trees, 
and other boundary markers because there is no other way of knowing where land 
boundaries begin and end. These capital investments involve costs not just to the farmer 
but to the economy as a whole. But without them, disputes over ownership and 
boundaries are more frequent. Of course, neighbors, especially when they are members of 
the same extended family or tribe, may be able to avoid disputes. But often, as Hernando 
de Soto famously observed, the only way for a stranger to know when he steps from one 
                                                 
7 Britannica Almanac 2003, p. 431. 
8 Britannica Almanac 2005, p. 292.  
9 Deininger (2003, p. xxiii). Deininger (2003) is a convenient and comprehensive review of World Bank 
and similar research on land policies for growth and poverty reduction,” and the reader is therefore referred 
to the original studies cited and reviewed in the Deininger book. 
10 De Soto (1993, p. 8).  
11 Deininger (2003, p. xxv). 
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person’s land to another’s is that a different dog barks.12 Disputes resulting in litigation 
consume real resources of the disputants and of the state.  
The economic and financial consequences of legal uncertainty are profound. The 
farmer cannot mortgage his property where no legal infrastructure protects his property 
and prescribes its metes and bounds. And if he cannot mortgage his property, he cannot 
borrow to improve his property, or to buy more land, or to start a new business. Of 
course, even with title, he may still be unable to borrow against the land if his property is 
so small that formal sector lenders have no incentive to lend the commensurately small 
sums involved. Moreover, social norms in indigenous areas may work against putting 
land up as collateral because nonpayment may result in transfer of the land to outsiders.13 
Investment in improving land, whether in drainage, irrigation or new types of 
crops, is important to output, productivity and the environment. Increasing legal certainty 
through titling also increases investment in improving the land, leading to higher 
agricultural production: 
 
Farmers in Thailand with title invested so much more in their land that 
their output was 14–25 percent higher than those working untitled land of 
the same quality. In Vietnam rural households with a document assigning 
clear rights of control and disposition commit 7.5 percent more land to 
crops requiring a greater initial outlay and yielding returns after several 
years than households without documentation. In Peru almost half those 
with title to their property in Lima’s squatter settlements have invested in 
improvements, compared with 13 percent of those without title.”14 
 
Moreover, where greater legal certainty has been created in developing country 
land markets, prices for land increase. The “value of rural land in Brazil, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand increases by anywhere from 43 percent to 81 percent after 
being titled.”15 Though higher land prices may be thought to create equity issues, these 
                                                 
12 De Soto (1993, p. 12). . 
13 Migot-Adholla et al. (1991). 
14 World Bank (2004, p. 80–81); Feder et al. (1988). 
15 World Bank (2004, p. 80). 
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higher prices are a good measure of the value of legal certainty created by titling. And the 
higher prices in turn create the collateral base for obtaining credit to improve the land, in 
turn leading to even higher prices.16  
Creating security of title thus has a two-part reinforcing effect. Not only does it 
reinforce the incentive to invest in land, but it also creates the wherewithal to be able to 
do so by increasing the ability to borrow the requisite funds: 
 
Farmers with secure title in Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Paraguay, and Thailand obtain larger loans on better terms than those 
without it. In Thailand farms with title borrowed anywhere from 50 
percent to five times more from banks and other institutional lenders than 
farmers with land identical but without title.17 
 
Similarly, the ability to start a business with funds obtained from mortgaging real 
estate is especially important, as developed country experience shows: “In the United 
States, up to 70% of the credit that new businesses receive comes from using formal titles 
as collateral for mortgages.”18  
Without legal certainty as to ownership, transferability of land is equally 
uncertain. Without legal certainty as to transferability, a market in land is difficult to 
create. And hence the normal function of land markets in moving land into more efficient 
and productive hands is likely to be slow or nonexistent. 
Lack of legal certainty also makes it difficult for an ambitious farm worker to 
become a farm owner. The result is that much land in developing countries is farmed by 
rental tenants. These tenants often enter into sharecropping agreements, in which the 
owner—who may be a distant city dweller—and the tenant share the crops (or their 
proceeds). Though such sharecropping agreements need not be notably inefficient from 
an economic viewpoint, studies show that farms let under such sharing arrangements are 
                                                 
16 Deininger (2003, p. 42–51). 
17 World Bank (2004, p. 81).  
18 De Soto (1993, p. 11).  
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not usually as efficient as farms operated by a resident owner.19 Thus, lack of legal 
certainty is not only a barrier to social and economic progress for the poor, but it also 
results in less than optimal agricultural production, a particularly serious economic 
problem in a developing economy still heavily focused on agriculture. 
Finally, legal uncertainty is not even good for the environment (contrary to the 
primitive notion that measures taken to increase agricultural output necessarily harm the 
environment). For example, a major cause of deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon is the 
absence of property rights, which leads to short-term strategies for rapid exploitation of 
land.20 A study of 53 countries concluded that “a modest improvement in the protection 
of property rights could reduce the rate of deforestation by as much as one-third.”21 But 
the correlation between greater security for property rights and sounder environmental 
practices is not limited to the deforestation example. Another study showed that 
“Ethiopian farmers are less likely to plant trees and build terraces to protect against 
erosion—and more likely to increase the use of fertilizer and herbicides—if their rights to 
land are insecure.”22  
In short, steady and sustainable economic development in the rural sector depends 
upon creating legal certainty with respect to ownership and transferability of land. 
 
Urban Real Estate  
 
Legal uncertainty as to ownership in cities is even more serious for economic 
development. This is true not just for business premises but also for house and apartment 
ownership. It is difficult for people living in developed countries with excellent legal 
certainty to appreciate what urban life, especially for the poor, can be where legal 
uncertainty prevails. Yet more than 50 percent of the peri-urban population in Africa and 
more than 40 percent in Asia live under informal tenure systems and have no protection 
from the formal legal system.23  
Just as security of tenure adds to property values of land, so too with urban 
residences: “For urban land, titling increases the value by 14 percent in Manila, by almost 
                                                 
19 See studies and references in Deininger (2003, p. 90–93).  
20 Deininger (2003, p. 41) and Alston et al. (1999).  
21 World Bank (2004, p. 81, Box 4.3).  
22 World Bank (2004, p. 81, Box 4.3). 
23 Deininger (2003, p. xxv). 
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25 percent in both Guayaquil, Ecuador, and Lima, Peru, and by 58 percent in Davao, 
Philippines.”24 And here too titling leads to investment, although not just in the premises; 
in Lima, Peru, residents who received title to urban property used that property as 
“collateral to buy microbuses, build small factories, and start other types of small 
businesses.”25 
In addition to the points comparable to rural areas with regard to the inability to 
borrow on the equity of a residence to start a business and to transferability issues in 
trying to buy or sell residences, the economic activities of city dwellers may be 
circumscribed. For example, the ever-present possibility of seizure or dispossession that 
arises through an inability to assert legal rights of ownership leads to the need for at least 
one family member to remain at home to protect the residence. Many are therefore forced 
to find some way of earning money at home.26 Often, of course, this means that women 
cannot enter the mainstream labor force and improve their economic position. Beyond the 
social effects, the economic result is that a large portion of the population is not able to 
make a reasonable economic contribution through their work. Moreover, the lack of 
opportunity for the improvement of skills through on-the-job experience and training 
restricts the economic development of the community. Titling of residential property 
leads to greater work outside the home with favorable long-term results for the 
economy.27 
 
Sources of Legal Uncertainty 
 
What are the sources of legal uncertainty? The short answer is that legal 
uncertainty arises from the fact that the question of ownership often lies outside the legal 
system. Ownership may be safeguarded by custom or social norms within a tribe or an 
extended family or even by customary legal systems operating without reference to, or 
support from, the formal legal system established by the state. Customary legal systems 
may dominate within vast tracts of territory. But the formal legal system, meaning the 
courts and administrative bodies of the state, often is not available to provide legal 
                                                 
24 World Bank (2004, p. 80).  
25 World Bank (2004, p. 81). 
26 Field (2004, p. 839) and Lanjouw and Levy (2004, p. 918–921).  
27 World Bank (2004, p. 81).  
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certainty—or, in common parlance, to protect property rights. 
In particular, legal uncertainty starts with the absence of property titles. One’s 
farm or house becomes, so far as the law is concerned, like an article of clothing or a 
personal computer to a developed country resident. Social norms against stealing and 
misappropriation may operate. But one’s ability to use the legal system to assert 
ownership and keep possession is minimal. One is best advised to keep one’s hands on the 
clothing and the computer, or lock them away. Though unlike clothing and computers, 
real estate cannot be moved, an owner without legal title may be dispossessed simply by 
someone more influential or stronger taking possession. 
In the case of land, the situation may not be a problem in a traditional community 
untroubled by outsiders. But rising population in many developing countries has strained 
even these communities as more and more people seek to survive and better themselves 
economically on the same amount of land. But even more disturbing to certainty than the 
multiplying of the local population is the intrusion of outsiders, whether they be wealthy 
merchants who seek land as an investment or entrepreneurial land companies or even 
urban and foreign settlers. An illustration is the case of Kenya in the 1930s, where “land 
hunger was pronounced due to white settlement” and as a result modern land legal 
systems were demanded and introduced, even though titling and land registration did not 
become systematic until the 1950s.28  
Economists studying the evolution from traditional communal land arrangements 
to legal protection have explained the latter as “endogenously” created by the interaction 
of supply and demand. What is meant is that the new legal system for land was not created 
because some domestic or international civil servant thought it would be a good idea. 
Rather, the demand from ordinary people for protection and certainty increased as land 
pressure and resulting disputes grew. In turn, the state (meaning politicians seeking votes 
or authoritarian rulers seeking popular support) invested in a legal system for land.  
When does demand for titles arise? North traces the transition in Northern Europe 
from communal ownership to legally protected individual ownership back to population 
increases.29 The use of titling often occurs in the second stage of development. In China, 
                                                 
28 Platteau (2000p. 124, 134).  
29 North and Thomas (1973, p. 59–64).  
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as discussed below, 30 year-use rights have recently been created and given at least some 
legal protection; but outright ownership and especially titling, along with their economic 
development advantages, remain only future possibilities. Sometimes, as the Kenya 
example discussed above shows, the demand for titles arises either from, or because of, 
new groups that enter the space that was previously communal. Titling is a mechanism to 
promote legal certainty. Of course, the demand for titles sometimes creates disputes 
between different population groups. 
An interesting example of the combination of population increase, new groups 
entering, and disputes between groups can be found in U.S. history. A major feature of 
the nineteenth century saga of westward expansion in the United States was conflict 
between ranchers and farmers. Most of the United States between the Great Plains and 
the Pacific costal region is relatively arid, more appropriate in the pre-irrigation era for 
ranching than farming. But U.S. public land policy, including the famous Homestead Act 
of 1862 (allowing those who improved land over a five-year period to obtain title), was 
patterned on the idea that land sales and homestead grants by the U.S. government should 
be for 160 acres (1/4 of a “section” measuring one mile square) per family since 160 
acres was large enough for one farm family’s economic success in the part of the country 
already settled. In the western United States the ranchers were the first to arrive since in 
the early part of the nineteenth century plenty of good farming land remained available in 
the eastern half of the country. But 160 acres was not enough for profitable ranching and 
so the ranchers, being unable to acquire government-owned land, simply made informal 
claims to much larger areas. By a combination of local agreement and social mores 
coupled with violence against those, especially newcomers, who did not recognize the 
informal claims, an informal land system of ranch-size claims arose.30  
But as the better farmland in the eastern United States grew scarce and the 
growing population of landless farmers, fed in part by immigration from Europe, pushed 
westward, conflict—sometimes violent—was inevitable. Naturally the farmers sought to 
homestead the land or buy from the U.S. government, thereby obtaining titles to the same 
land that the ranchers were exploiting without titles.31 The ranchers—considering the 
                                                 
30 Anderson and Hill (2004, p. 160–166).  
31 Anderson and Hill (2004, p. 23). 
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farmers mere squatters—acted, first, by illegally fencing their claimed lands, and then by 
taking their cause to the U.S. Congress, where various compromises resulted over a 
period of decades.32 
 
Issues in Titling 
  
The most common issues concerning titling involve finding a way to give existing 
“owners” actual titles. De Soto popularized the idea of titling in his 1989 and 2000 
books.33 But titling was a government response, even in the developing world, before 
DeSoto wrote his two books. Titling was introduced successfully in the 1980s in 
Thailand.34 A major titling effort in Ecuador beginning in 1993 was directed at urban 
areas.35  
One of the problems in titling, especially in urban areas, is determining the 
identity of the actual owner who should be awarded the title. In the massive movement of 
people off the land into cities in the latter part of the twentieth century in the developing 
world, vast informal urban agglomerations grew up without effective governance and 
law. In Peru, De Soto’s home country, a massive titling effort ran into difficulties in these 
informal areas due to conflicting claims to the same parcel of land.36  
Titling is only half of the battle if the objective is to create economic 
development. The elimination of existing restrictions on free transferability of land is 
equally important. First, land, even if titled, cannot be used as a means of raising money 
for investment in the land, whether for improved productivity or for side commercial 
ventures, unless the land can be mortgaged. And mortgages will not be available unless 
foreclosure is possible, which means that the lender must be able to assume title to the 
land. 
One study of Thailand found that the major benefit of titling was precisely the 
ability to borrow from formal financial institutions, rather than security of ownership as 
such. Access to credit was over three times greater on titled than untitled land.37 Hence, 
                                                 
32 Libecap (1981, p. 3, 20–23, 31–36) and Gates (1968, p. 466–468).  
33 De Soto (1989) and De Soto (2000).  
34 World Bank (2001, p. 36). 
35 Lanjouw and Levy (2004, p. 912).  
36 Payne (2002, p. 17).  
37 Deininger (2003, p. 49, Figure 2.5). 
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the benefit of titling comes in large measure, at least in Thailand, from legal 
transferability.38  
A political, and sometimes ideological, issue that sometimes arises in developing 
countries is that free transferability of land evokes an image of landless rural poor. The 
notion is that small farm owners will be duped or coerced into selling out. Indeed, 
market-oriented land reform involving free transferability is at odds with the ideology of 
land reform that in many countries earlier supported the breaking up of large estates in 
favor of landless peasants. At the same time, it must be recognized that these early land 
reform efforts were not only successful in breaking up large estates but sometimes 
increased output and productivity through transfer to individual farmer ownership.39 In 
more policy-oriented terms, the fear is simply that transferability will lead to greater 
income inequality. Yet lack of transferability is likely to limit the economic development 
promise of titling efforts in the countryside. Moreover, transferability was shown, in a 
World Bank study of Colombia, to “make a significant contribution to greater 
equalization of the operational structure of land holdings and, to a more limited extent, 
the ownership structure.”40 In short, “rental and sales markets were more effective in 
transferring land to poor but productive producers than was administrative land 
reform.”41 
A different kind of problem arises from the hard-to-escape condition that titling 
involving free transferability must be based on the existence of a land registry.42 It is only 
by land registration that a buyer can be sure to be dealing with the legal owner, that the 
land is free of legal encumbrances such as mortgages, and that the boundaries of the plot 
of land correspond to the seller’s representations. A registration system must not only be 
                                                 
38 Feder and Feeney (1991). 
39 Deininger (2003, p. 16–17) and sources cited therein. 
40 Deininger et al. (2004).  
41 Deininger et al. (2004, Abstract). 
42 The United States does not use a land registration system but rather a system for the recordation of 
deeds and encumbrances such as mortgages. A Torrens land registration system was partially adopted in 
some states in the twentieth century, but even in those states land registration has not been a successful 
competitor with an already well-established recording system (supplemented by title insurance). Casner et 
al. (2000, p. 783–820) and Miceli et al. (2002). Britain made a major move to a land registration system in 
1925. Bostick (1987). The reason land registration has not been successful in the United States has little 
relevance to developing countries, which would most probably find it even more difficult to introduce an 
American deed and mortgage recording system, which in practice requires not just qualified civil servants 
but also private lawyers (to interpret the result of title searches) and a title insurance system. 
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created, but the existing owner has to know about the land registration process and be 
motivated to register. The result in Kenya has been that it is the larger farms with better 
access to markets that turn out to be the farms that are registered.43  
Titling costs money. It cannot function properly without the rest of the legal 
infrastructure that goes with it: A cadastral survey showing property boundaries and 
landmarks is indispensable. So too land registries are expensive to create and maintain.44  
More than just the mechanics of surveys and registries is involved. A competent 
administration of the system is needed. Accuracy and promptness are important:  
 
In Mozambique there is a backlog of about 10,000 applications for land 
rights, which means long delays between receipt of an investment plan and 
eventual granting of the land right. In Cameroon the minimum amount of 
time it takes to register a plot is 15 months, and registration commonly 
takes between 2 and 7 years. In Peru the official adjudication process takes 
43 months and 207 steps in 48 offices, although an expedited process is 
now being implemented in selected areas.45  
  
Obviously middle-income countries are more likely than poorer countries to be able to 
afford the infrastructure and perhaps also to field a sufficiently competent bureaucracy to 
make land registration work smoothly. A further important factor is that the judiciary has 
to be educated in the new system and be ready to enforce these newly created formal 
rights. Land registration is thus an example of a situation where some economic 
development is require to generate the resources necessary for legal solutions that create 
the basis for further economic development. In short, legal development and economic 
development in such instances must necessarily advance hand in hand. 
If the advantages that a developed legal system for land titling, registration and 
transferability are to be realized, especially with regard to enabling mortgage borrowing 
through the use of land as security, appropriate laws on mortgage security are necessary, 
though by no means sufficient. The judiciary must be prepared to foreclose in accordance 
                                                 
43 Platteau (2000, p. 134–135).  
44 Deininger (2003, p. 70–71).  
45 World Bank (2001, p. 35, Box 2.4).  
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with the statute. Otherwise, banks and other financial institutions will not lend. Among 
the problems that can arise, aside from corruption, is that judges may be reluctant to 
throw the poor off their land or out of their houses. And still another problem is that 
financial institutions may be unwilling to lend for other reasons. In Brazil, India, and 
Russia, macroeconomic instability and the resulting rampant inflation made the 
development of a mortgage market difficult.46 In any case banks may be unwilling to lend 
to borrowers of small sums; capacity to pay and the costs of servicing small bank loans 
remain crucial to bank lending decisions.47  
 
Transferability: Precedents and Problems 
 
Titling and land registration, even with all the administrative and legal 
infrastructure, will fail to deliver the full economic benefits if transferability is limited by 
statutory restrictions. One common kind of such restrictions limits transfer to the 
transferor’s kinship line.48 Alternatively, transfer may be subject to approval by some 
specified authority.49  
Similar restraints on alienation of land were common in early English history. 
These restraints contrast with the ancient world of Greece and Rome, where free 
alienability was more common. “Plato bought a farm. Cicero sold his house.”50 In 
England restraints arose mainly as part of feudal land relationships established in the 
Middle Ages and modified over time in the ensuing struggle between the Crown and 
nobles. Under the early feudal system all land was, in principle, owned by the Crown and 
held in a chain of dependent ownership through the high nobility and down to the actual 
tenant owner. Furthermore, all transfers required, in principle, the approval of the Crown 
or an intervening noble in the feudal chain.51  
Even after the 1290 statute Quia Emptores simplified the feudal system by 
prohibiting “subinfeudation,” and thereby restricting chains of dependent ownership, 
problems arose under this modified feudal system that would not have arisen under a 
                                                 
46 Lewis (2004, p. 155, 240).  
47 Kagawa and Turksta (2002, p. 68).  
48 Ellickson (1993, p. 1375).  
49 Ellickson (1993, p. 1375). 
50 Ellickson (1993, p. 1377). 
51 Casner et al. (2000, p. 253–258).  
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system where each plot of land was owned outright by a single person. Over the centuries 
the English aristocracy and later the rising gentry class52 sought to insure that their landed 
estates would remain within the family generation after generation by using various legal 
devices, especially strict settlement and common recovery.53 
These legal techniques were restraints on alienation that kept land off the market. 
Eventually, in an evolution that lasted some centuries, entail (which was an interest in 
land normally created, for example, in the use of strict settlement) was abolished.54 (In 
Virginia the entail was abolished by statute under the leadership of the 33 year old 
Thomas Jefferson.55) The abolition of entail constituted a rejection of the aristocratic 
desire to keep land permanently within a family and a transition to the principle that land, 
in a modern economy, should be freely transferable. But even under modern Anglo-
American land law, it is possible for an owner to find alternatives to the entail in other 
ways so long as the conveyed interest vests in some person within, under one formulation 
of the Rule Against Perpetuities, “a life in being plus 21 years.” The policy of this Rule is 
that “a man of property…[may] provide for all of those in his family whom he personally 
knew and the first generation after them upon attaining majority.”56 Quite recently 
legislation in some U.S. states has amended the Rule Against Perpetuities to allow so-
called perpetual trusts and other devices for tax avoidance in the transfer of property from 
one generation to another.57 But, in general, contemporary policy in developed countries, 
certainly in Anglo-Saxon law countries, treats land as a commodity in a market economy, 
subject to land use restrictions imposed by public regulation. 
The gradual elimination of restraints on alienation in the developed world was 
accompanied by more rapid economic growth, and assured that that growth was enjoyed 
in the agricultural as well as in the commercial and emerging industrial economies. Some 
economic studies substantiate the importance of removing restraints on alienation. 
                                                 
52 For a general discussion on the gentry, see Tawney (1941).  
53 For a nontechnical explanation of strict settlement, see English and Saville (1983) and Spring (1993, 
p. 123–147). On common recovery, see the example in definition for “common recovery” in Black’s Law 
Dictionary, 8th ed. ed. Bryan A. Garner, p. 295 (2004) and Simpson (1983, p. 129–132). For further details, 
see Biancalana (2001).  
54 See Leach and Tudor (1952, § 24.16) and Reid (1995) and sources cited therein.  
55 “Entail.” Encyclopædia Britannica. 1970. 607–608. 
56 Quoted in Dukeminier and Krier (1988, p. 251).  
57 See Sitkoff and Schanzenbach (2005 forthcoming).  
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“Several studies of China, one of the few countries that has experimented with allowing 
different systems of transfer rights across different provinces, have confirmed that higher 
levels of transferability were positively correlated with higher levels of farm 
investment.”58  
Restrictions on, and regulation of, land markets can have major economic effects 
for the entire economy. A recent World Bank analysis pointed out:  
 
High transactions costs in land markets can also either increase the cost of 
providing credit or require the costly development of collateral substitutes, 
in both cases constraining private sector development…. [A] recent study 
that estimates that taking both direct and indirect effects together, land 
market distortions reduce the annual rate of gross domestic product growth 
in India by 1.3 percent.59 
A poorly functioning land registry system is a de facto restriction on 
landmarkets and thereby on both financial markets and on 
entrepreneurship in creating new enterprises.60 Property registration need 
take no more than a week, but it takes on average 274 days in Nigeria, 363 
days in Bangladesh and 683 days in Haiti.61 Costs can be on average much 
less than one percent of the property value, but they range as high as 18 
percent in Senegal, 22 percent in Zimbabwe, and 30 percent in Syria.62 
 
One particularly pernicious restraint involves restrictions on land rentals. Such 
restrictions can have profound effects in view of the popularity of rentals as a dominant 
form of farmland exploitation. Even where communal holdings are not a factor, the 
family-owned farm is not necessarily the model followed. In developed countries a large 
percentage of all farmland is rented, with rental percentages ranging from 71 percent in 
Belgium to 43 percent in the United States, where in certain regions the family-owned 
                                                 
58 World Bank (2001, p. 35).  
59 Deininger (2003, p. 2).  
60 World Bank (2006, p. 27-32). 
61 World Bank (2006, p. 29, Table 5.2). 
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farm has iconic importance. 63 A variety of economic factors lead to the conclusion that 
the owner-operated farm is not always the optimal form of farm enterprise.64 Land rental 
has the social advantage of allowing people who would otherwise be farm employees or 
even unemployed to become independent farm operators. In fact, where the objective is 
to provide the poor with their own land, land rental has been shown to be more effective 
than land reform.65  
From a Rule of Law perspective, restrictions on land sales and rentals are 
restrictions on enforcement of contracts as well as limitations on property rights. 
However, restrictions on land sales are usually byproducts of national real property 
systems. To take just one example, if land is legally held in communal form, then 
individual farmers—whatever their rights within the community—have no 
governmentally protected right to transfer their particular parcel to nonmembers of the 
community. Restrictions on rentals, however, take many forms, some having little to do 
with the underlying property rights system. A prime example involves rent controls, 
which make illegal any rental contract exceeding the ceiling rental amount. Such rent 
controls have seriously discouraged land rentals.66  
A number of countries do not recognize land rental contracts at all.67 Often these 
prohibitions are part of a land reform program involving the breaking up of large estates, 
and the prohibition was motivated by a desire to assure that the recipients of the 
redistributed land actually farmed them. This is no doubt the motivation for the purported 
prohibition in land reform regulations of rental tenancy in India, which led to a much 
lower rate of even informal land tenancy. 68  
Some countries prohibit certain forms of rental contract; the most common is a 
prohibition on sharecropping, where the landlord and tenant share crop harvests (or the 
proceeds).69 One motive for such prohibitions may have been to protect those who 
worked the fields. Despite a long tradition even among economists of viewing 
sharecropping as an inefficient substitute for cash rentals, restraints on sharecropping are 
                                                 
63 Deininger (2003, p. 99). 
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65 Deininger et al. (2004) and Deininger and Jin (2002).  
66 Deininger (2003, p. 116–118). 
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today generally considered unfortunate from an economic viewpoint; sharecropping 
allows the poor, who do not have the resources to acquire land, to benefit nevertheless 
from their energy and skill as farmers without having to limit themselves to being simply 
farm laborers. Thus, although as previously noted, sharecropping may not be as efficient 
as owner-operated farming, sharecropping is often the most efficient form of rental 
contract available. 
Recent decades have seen the gradual shedding in the developing world of 
restraints on sale and rental that were imposed by earlier governments of a revolutionary 
or socialist ideology and that sought thereby to reduce inequality in income and wealth. 
The gradual lifting of these restraints on alienation appears in part to be the result of 
greater understanding that these restraints have limited economic growth and have not 
necessarily led to greater equality. An interesting historical parallel can thus be drawn to 
the gradual elimination of restraints on alienation in traditional English (and early 
American) land law, again as the pernicious impact of the restraints came to be 
understood. The difference between the recent developing country experience and the 
earlier experience is, of course, that the English-origin restraints on alienation were 
originally intended to preserve inequality of income and wealth by keeping land within 




If titling and registration are so important, why don’t developing countries adopt 
the appropriate measures immediately? Aside from the cost and the absence of a trained 
bureaucracy, titling and registration are sometimes resisted by the very people who could 
benefit. Their objections may, in part at least, be rational from their individual point of 
view, but as in so many issues of economic policy, individual preferences do not 
necessarily add up to an optimum result for the economy as a whole. Still, one reason 
why optimism about the economic development effects of titling should be tempered is 
that land constitutes, in many countries, a combination of insurance and pension fund:  
 
Land continues to be perceived as a crucial asset for the present and/or 
future subsistence of the family, all the more so as it is a secure form of 
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holding wealth and a good hedge against inflation. (‘It is our bank and we 
will not part with it’, said the member of a founding lineage in a village 
close to Matam, Senegal). That considerations of social insurance 
determine attitudes of deep attachment to land is understandable in a 
context of scarce alternative employment opportunities and risky labour 
markets.70  
 
One of the transition problems in moving from the traditional concept is that the 
patriarch of an extended family may very well be the person who would register the land 
on behalf of the family. Other members of the family may feel dispossessed by the 
movement to a market economy concept of ownership if they lose the implicit right to be 
supported in their old age, or if they become disabled or seriously ill. For a lawyer trained 
in the common law system, the situation is analogous to one where a trustee of a trust on 
behalf of a widow and minor children decides to transfer the property held as trustee into 
the trustee’s own name; the trustee may still feel responsible to the beneficiaries, but they 
cannot count on it.  
Hence, social norms and family pressures may work against land registration. 
This is especially true because even if a family patriarch or clan leader might want to 
recognize, through the land registration process itself, the rights and expectations of the 
rest of the members of the extended family or clan, it is almost impossible to see how that 
could be done without losing many of the benefits of land registration: If members of the 
extended family were to be listed as co-owners, the written agreement of all would be 
necessary to mortgage the property or to sell the land. The upshot is that for some people 
in the developing world, land registration creates more legal and economic uncertainty 
than it eliminates. An Anglo-American type of trust (or its civil law equivalents) might 
work, but the trust—which arose over the centuries in the evolution of English law—may 
not be available and in any event the institution of the trust evokes a culture distant from 
most traditional societies in the developing world.71  
Another kind of problem that developed country lawyers might classify as a law 
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enforcement matter, but in the field is more often classified as “land grabbing,” involves 
fraud in the land registration process. Platteau summarizes documented examples of 
Kenya where “clever, well-informed or powerful (and usually educated) individuals … 
often successfully jockey to have parcels not previously theirs registered in their own 
name while the mass of rural people are generally unaware of the new land provisions or 
do not grasp the implications of registration.”72 He also refers to a “few well-connected 
Kenyans who succeeded in having pasture lands registered in their own names on the 
ground that they would bring them into cultivation” whereas “their intent was not to 
exploit the land in question but just to use it as collateral in order to obtain loans from 
banks in Nairobi” to be used for personal purposes without intention of repayment but 
rather with the intent to allow the land to be foreclosed.73 In peri-urban areas where 
wealthy city dwellers are intent on real estate development in nearby formerly 
agricultural areas, fraud and corruption in the titling process may lead the farm 
population to perceive titling as more of a threat than a benefit. 
In a developed country with the Rule of Law, a few well-publicized criminal 
prosecutions might stamp out such unfortunate practices. But in poor rural areas where 
the Rule of Law itself is still in question and when neither the legal and administrative 
infrastructure nor the countryside literacy required to build confidence in the intention 
and integrity of the new system has yet been developed, such frauds are more likely. At 
least in Africa, feelings of resentment and jealous toward groups that benefited from land 
registration led to social tensions and a reassertion of tribal and clan rights, even to the 
extent of rewriting history to reinforce those rights. These feelings have been exacerbated 
by ethnic tensions where one ethnic group sees itself losing by land registration to a 
stronger, wealthier ethnic group.74  
 The conclusion for agricultural land is that land registration may be an important 
stimulus to economic development, but its adoption is likely to be resisted by many 
people in the developing world who would ultimately benefit by the economic 
advantages it could bring over time. In the case of urban real estate, say houses or 
apartments, one can see that this property serves “both as insurance against uncertain 
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employment … in the next generation of the family, and as a pension fund for their old 
days.”75 To these practical individual considerations one must also add tribal traditions 
and social mores demanding that land that belonged to ancestors should be kept.76 At 
least in earlier decades local violence and more subtle forms of resistance were used to 





Thus far the discussion in this chapter has been mostly about titling and market 
transfer of land that is already in private hands. Logically a prior question is involved in 
land that remains owned by tribes or other group entities. Such land would have to be 
spun off into individual hands (in what is often called freehold tenure to distinguish it 
from communal ownership) before the process just discussed would even come into 
question. 
The question of communal (often called customary tenure) land is extremely 
important. In many developing countries, communal land, operating under traditional 
institutions, has preceded not just independence but colonization itself. With few 
exceptions, issues involving communal land are outside the formal legal system. The 
formal legal system in Africa, for example, “covers at most between 2 and 10 percent of 
the total land area.”78 Disputes that arise therefore have to be dealt with by customary 
institutions—say, within the tribe or clan—and no effective resort to the regular courts is 
possible because the national substantive land law simply does not apply. In general, 
colonial powers applied their own law to their citizens and often to disputes between 
citizens and the native population, but the native population was left to its own customary 
law. Until such time as land is titled and registered, a developing country may have no 
way of applying national rules concerning land. As a result, “in Africa, customary 
institutions administer virtually all of the land area, including some peri-urban areas with  
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high land values where demand for land transactions and more formal property rights is 
increasing.”79 
As we have seen in the preceding chapter, it is a fundamental economic 
proposition that land subject to open access—by analogy, let’s say, to ocean fisheries—is 
likely to be overexploited. Not only is the current use therefore likely to be inefficient but 
the long-term negative consequences, both environmental and economic, are likely to be 
serious if not sometimes catastrophic. 
U.S. history is ripe with examples. The two most famous American settlements, 
Jamestown and Plymouth, started off with communal ownership. But both soon switched 
to individual ownership. The results for productivity were positive. In both cases, the 
switch may have been just in time for survival.80  
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that all communal ownership is so 
inefficient that it is an obstacle to economic development. The prime reason is that much 
communal property is not truly open access property.81 The most common communal 
arrangement involves plots controlled by individuals with, say, pasture and perhaps 
hunting areas subject to open access for members of the community—but not open to 
access by outsiders. In many cases, the strips are scattered. But because the tribe or clan 
is sufficiently close-knit with local governance and social norms assuring compliance 
with the strip boundaries, there is no problem of a tragedy of the commons. Indeed, an 
advantage is that only the land of the community as a whole has to be fenced to keep out 
animals and perhaps strangers.  
The communal property arrangements are under a special legal system—
communal law administered by the tribe or clan. Often the individual plots can be bought 
and sold, albeit within the tribe or clan. And they often can be inherited. Thus, a good 
deal of legal certainty obtains, but as the foregoing discussion of titling and land 
registration indicates, the arrangements are not optimum for economic development of 
the kind enjoyed in the developed world. That does not necessarily mean that communal 
property arrangements are not efficient within the communal land area itself, at least 
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where exchange and sale among members of the community can occur and rights are 
inheritable.  
Larger questions arise where population pressures, encroachment of urban life, 
and discontinuities cause communal systems to break down. Certainly the unorganized 
squalor on the outskirts of some developing country cities (which is presumably what De 
Soto had in mind in the Lima area that he researched) is not an example of communal 
property at all. Here the new residents often have no property rights, either individually 
or through their membership in a communal property group. A confusion between 
communal property and “unofficial” settlements simply clouds understanding and 
analysis. 
As already discussed, communal pasture and hunting areas are normally open 
access land, but only to members of the community. If outsiders can be kept out, then it is 
up to local governance and social norms to prevent the “overgrazing” that the tragedy of 
the commons postulates. In effect, some kind of quota system has to be worked out, 
explicitly or implicitly, if pasture and hunting land proves scarce. Here again one can see 
that private ownership would in principle be better for economic development. On the 
other hand, even the common areas have something to be said for them, again so long as 
nonmembers of the community can be kept out. Not only are fences dividing pasture and 
hunting areas of the community unnecessary, but it is possible to take advantage of 
certain efficiencies; for example, one part of the common pasture area may be better in 
certain seasons than other parts and hence the ability of herds of all farmers to move with 
the season may be an efficiency consideration that offsets any tendency toward 
overgrazing.  
 
Another Look at History 
 
A short summary of the discussion thus far is that the process of moving to a 
market economy in land is likely to be evolutionary rather than purely technocratic. Legal 
transplants can help, but only if the legal infrastructure is in place and even then results 
are likely to be measured in most countries in years, if not decades. This conclusion is all 
the more important for the process of moving from communal to individual ownership. 
Again the lessons of Northern Europe some centuries ago, especially the conflict 
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involved in the enclosure movement, suggest that attitudes and practices involving 
something as fundamental as land are likely to take at least one or two generations to 
change. 
Although communal land systems today unquestionably differ greatly from 
country to country, even within a region such as sub-Saharan Africa, the resemblance of 
the economic aspects of traditional communal tenure arrangements to the historical 
situation in Northern Europe prior to the enclosure movement is nevertheless remarkable. 
Although the details in Northern Europe differed from country to country, the well-
documented system in England conveys the strengths and weakness of communal 
ownership. It also shows how an evolution, largely through legislative action, can move 
successfully, though not without controversy, a country’s land system from communal to 
individual ownership over a period of time. 
Beginning at least as far back as the fifteenth century and continuing until 
Parliamentary legislation became the standard method in the mid-eighteenth century, the 
enclosure movement in the English Midlands involved converting communal land to 
private ownership through mutually agreed transactions among all members of the 
community (the “proprietors”) or bilaterally between two of them, such as by purchase or 
exchange.82 As land became less plentiful and population increased, controversy arose as 
to the impact of enclosures on the poor. Finally, beginning in the mid-eighteenth century 
enclosures pursuant to private acts of Parliament increased and in 1801 a General 
Enclosure Act created a procedure for enclosure.83  
The structure of “open fields” in England in the “parliamentary enclosure” period 
resembles communal property in much of today’s developing world. Individual farmers 
had strips within a community, and there was a common pasture. The strips could be sold 
or exchanged, the common pasture was available to open access by all members of the 
community, and even the strips were open to pasture when no crops were being grown at 
the time.  
Strip farming had its disadvantages and its advantages. On the disadvantage side, 
the strips in England were often so small that plows could be used only in the lengthwise 
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direction of a given strip and even if a given farmer’s lands might be more rectangular in 
shape, a farmer’s separate plots might be too widely spaced to permit efficient use. 
McCloskey uses the following image: “A moderately prosperous peasant would hold his 
20 acres in 20 plots scattered over the face of a village the size of Central Park.”84 But 
many villages did not even have plots of that one-acre average size, and in many cases a 
farmer’s lands would be spread over many more plots. Turner points to a village in 
Lincolnshire where a 105 acre farm was separated into 162 separate plots and to a farm in 
Buckinghamshire where a Mr. Yates, though he had 78.5 acres, had to farm them in 218 
separate plots.85  
But there were advantages to the open fields system as well. One was that fences 
were not necessary, except perhaps around the village as a whole, although of course a 
shepherding or other arrangement had to be used to keep the sheep and cattle out of the 
crops during part of the year. The absence of fences was a substantial cost saving to the 
agricultural economy. Other advantages were that the separate strips might have had 
diversification or insurance payoffs since the quality of land and even the temperatures 
might vary from one plot to another; hence, the farmer could specialize within his own 
acreage by matching plants to soil and frost conditions, while at the same time not putting 
“all of his eggs in one basket.”86  
 
From Communal Property to Individual Property 
 
Given the advantages of communal property arrangements and the political 
sensitivity of any changes that might threaten individual economic well-being and even 
survival, one policy implication is that the transition from communal ownership to 
individual ownership has to be handled carefully. The history of the Côte d’Ivoire, which 
committed itself to a transition to full nationwide individual ownership within ten years, 
is instructive. The task (which, remember, includes surveys, demarcation of boundaries, a 
registration process involving a large governmental staff, and more) was simply too much 
for an inadequate bureaucracy. It has been suggested that the recent civil war in that 
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country is not unrelated to the difficulties created by the land tenure conversion effort.87 
Fortunately, alternatives exist permitting the upgrading of tenure security over time as 
opposed to a one-shot conversion from communal to pure individual ownership. An 
experiment along such gradualist lines was carried out in Namibia.88 Similarly, Botswana 
has successfully used gradualism to make the transitions.89  
Certainly a move from communal ownership, however much tempered by 
individual use rights, to full-fledged individual titles and land registration is likely to 
meet some resistance. One constraint that has sometimes stood in the way of 
thoroughgoing titling and registration reforms is a set of social norms that conflict with 
the individualistic philosophy of the reforms. One particular problem, for example, has 
been the difficulty of assuring women the right to participate in ownership and 
registration upon the death of a spouse, especially where the prior communal systems 
subordinated their rights to those of their husband or extended family.90  
A different kind of problem arises in those countries such as China, Mexico, and 
Ethiopia in which collective ownership was imposed in the wake of revolutions. The 
consequence was that neither local governance nor social norms worked to ameliorate the 
negative economic effects of the resulting “communal” system. The negative 
consequences of such forced communalization can be found in the Mexican ejido system 
introduced in the 1920s and 1930s, and not fully reformed until 1992.91 Under the earlier 
system investment fell, the work became more labor intensive, and even crop choice was 
biased toward short-term payoffs.92 The reformed system provides for full privatization, 
including land registration and the ability to mortgage land, but at least in some parts of 
Mexico, farmers have been reluctant to take advantage of such titling, in part because 
“land taxes rise sharply upon privatization,93 surely a counterproductive approach to 
improving productivity and farm incomes.  
China has nonetheless used a gradualist approach, with good effect for 
productivity and output, by implementing, through the household responsibility system, 
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individual use rights in the early 1980s, which has ameliorated the effects of 
collectivization.94 It is interesting, however, that neither local governance nor the social 
norms that give effective rights to individual farmers under traditional communal systems 
were available to cushion the transition. For example, corruption and abuses of power by 
village authorities were reasons why the degree of tenure security varied greatly from 
village to village and why the Chinese government moved more recently to deal with 
those problems.95 In 2003 a Rural Land Contracting Law became effective, giving 
farmers thirty-year use rights to their land, subject to some limitations, without any land 
registration system; abuses by local government and party officials remain a problem, 
and mortgaging of land has not been fully institutionalized across the country.96 
Similarly, urban property owners have found little protection of their 30-year land 
use rights. Four million residents in Shanghai and Beijing were evicted without 
compensation between 1991 and 2003. 97 Although some cities have acted to allow 
mortgages, the legal basis for mortgages is not uniformly available across China. 
Moreover, as the 2005 prospectus for a Hong Kong offering of shares of China 
Construction Bank, one of China’s largest banks, makes clear:  
The procedures for liquidating or otherwise realizing the value of collateral of 
borrowers in China may be protracted, and the enforcement process in China may be 
difficult. As a result, it may be difficult and time-consuming for banks to take control of 
or liquidate the collateral securing nonperforming loans. Furthermore, according to a 
judicial interpretation issued by the Supreme Court of the PRC…courts may not foreclose 
on, auction off, or otherwise collateral if such collateral is the borrower’s essential 
residence. Accordingly, we may be unable to realize the expected value on collateral in a 
timely manner or at all.98 
Nevertheless, the reforms show that the central government has attempted to guide the 
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evolution of land holdings toward a more efficient system despite the reluctance of local 
authorities who fear loss of flexibility and, no doubt in some cases, of opportunities for 
personal gain. 
A further approach involves starting by giving official legal status to existing 
communal institutions. Colombia, for example, has introduced collective land titling for 
particular indigenous groups.99 In Mozambique a 1997 statute recognized customary 
rights of individuals, but gave communities what amounts to titles and registration. This 
approach was a reaction to the circumstance that in Mozambique some 20 different 
customary systems were operating (which was one reason why giving land titles to 
individuals was beyond the fiscal and bureaucratic capacity of the country at the time). 
And while the system does not provide the credit advantages of individual titling and 
registration, it does provide a system by which individuals can transfer their land and it 
also allows the community to negotiate with outsiders for the exploitation of natural 
resources.100  
An increasing number of countries simply recognize in their formal legal systems 
the validity of individual rights under existing communal systems. This approach, which 
bows to the fiscal and bureaucratic difficulties of full-scale individual titling and 
registration, is only a small step in the direction of a market economy approach to 
economic development.  
Nonetheless, formal legal recognition of individual rights to a plot in a larger tract 
of communal land may have some economic value. Indeed, as suggested earlier in this 
chapter, such recognition of individual rights already exists in many communal systems. 
However, traditional communal law frequently gives elders or chiefs the power to 
reallocate some or all of a plot, where—for example—they conclude that the owners are 
not properly working the plot. Since naturally at least some neighbors want more land, 
the resulting pressures for reallocation cause current owners to be cautious, especially 
about taking part-time jobs off the farm because they fear it may lead to land being 
reallocated away from them. Since “greater involvement by rural households in the off-
farm economy is widely recognized as a critical pre-condition for broad-based rural 
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development,”101 protecting farmers against reallocation through the formal legal system 
can assist national economic development. Though it is difficult to know the quantitative 
effect on labor supply of threatened land reallocation, we do know that comprehensive 





The thrust of the foregoing discussion is that communal land systems need not be 
inefficient and therefore automatically in need of conversion to individual ownership. But 
that conclusion suffers from becoming irrelevant where the forces of economic and 
population expansion encroach upon communal land. Expansion of cities, new mining 
and logging ventures, and discovery of oil resources are examples of the kind of 
economic changes that can undermine communal systems when the changes encroach on 
the boundaries of communal land. Then property arrangements will have to be modified, 
and the tactical issue for the country is whether to attempt to safeguard the communal 
land system or to attempt to adjust to the encroaching reality by a transition to individual 
freehold ownership. In any event, for countries with substantial indigenous populations, a 
change in substantive land law is clearly a major economic development decision. Titling 
is important, but the implementation of a titling program is fraught with administrative, 
financial, and even human capital issues involving surveys and registration systems. And, 
as in so many other areas of substantive law, even a successful implementation of a titling 
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